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THE PARADOX OF POLITICAL POWER: POST-RACIALISM,
EQUAL PROTECTION, AND DEMOCRACY
William M. Carter, Jr.*
[A] reasonable jury could easily find that the City’s real
reason . . . was . . . a simple desire to please a politically important
racial constituency.
1
—Ricci v. DeStefano
Democracy is premised on responsiveness.
2
—Citizens United v. FEC

INTRODUCTION
Racial minorities have enjoyed increasing electoral success in recent years,
while continuing to rank at or near the bottom in terms of health, wealth,
income, education, and the effects of the criminal justice system.3 Some
observers, including some members of the Supreme Court, have pointed to
evidence of isolated electoral success as proof of “post-racialism,” while
ignoring the evidence of substantial continued disparities for the vast majority
of people of color.
This Essay will examine the tension between repeated calls for racial
minorities to achieve their goals through the political process and the Supreme
Court’s increasingly restrictive “colorblind,” or “post-racial,” jurisprudence,
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This Essay benefited greatly from
the comments and critiques I received at the Law and Society Association’s 2011 Annual Meeting and at the
Constitutional Law Colloquium organized by Mark Tushnet of Harvard Law School during the American
Constitution Society’s 2011 National Convention. I would also like to thank Mike Lizerbram for his research
assistance. This Essay is dedicated to my nieces and nephew, Alissa, Brianna, and William (“Tre”) Snoddy.
Know that your dreams are always within reach and that you can change the world. Do not let it change you.
1 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2688 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
2 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
3 See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 982–92 (2010)
(surveying statistical data indicating continued racial disparities along many measures of economic and social
success); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
803, 806–07 (2004) (same). This is not to suggest that racial minorities have not achieved substantial gains
relative to earlier times. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 791, 793 n.15 (2011) (citing statistics showing improvements in a variety of material
conditions for African-Americans since the Civil Rights Era).
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which severely limits the circumstances in which racial minorities can
effectively exercise their political power once it has been attained. Examples
include City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., where the Court struck down an
affirmative action program adopted by a majority-black city council;4 Ricci v.
DeStefano, where black and Latino residents of New Haven successfully
lobbied the City of New Haven to discard a test for promotions in the fire
department because the test resulted in substantial exclusion of racial
minorities, only to have the City’s action struck down by the Court;5 and
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder
(NAMUDNO), where the renewal of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act passed
the House and Senate by overwhelming margins, only to have its
constitutionality strongly questioned by the Supreme Court.6
This Essay argues that the Court’s suspicion of the exercise of minority
political power will only increase as its post-racial jurisprudence accelerates.
For racial minorities, the countermajoritarian difficulty is likely to become
much more difficult.
I. THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND POST-RACIALISM
For decades, scholars have attempted to resolve the “countermajoritarian
difficulty”: the proper role of an unelected federal judiciary in mediating
conflicts between majority rule and minority rights.7 The primary justification
for heightened judicial scrutiny of government action disadvantaging certain
minority groups has been the “process-defect” rationale.8 Declaring elected
officials’ actions unconstitutional is, of course, always antidemocratic in a
“thin” sense.9 Doing so is nonetheless considered justified with regard to laws

4

488 U.S. 469 (1989).
129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
6 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
7 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press, 2d ed. 1986) (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a countermajoritarian force in our system.”).
8 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (noting that “prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may . . . tend[] seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,” thereby requiring “a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry” in such cases); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–79 (1980) (discussing process-defect theory as a reason for judicial intervention on
behalf of minorities).
9 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional
Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 936 (2001) (questioning the premise of the countermajoritarian difficulty
5
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burdening certain minority groups because they are presumed to be unable to
fully protect their interests through the political process, due to their numerical
disadvantages, the majority’s aversion to them or their interests, and histories
of prejudice and subordination.10 In other words, the judiciary helps those who
cannot help themselves.
Critics have long suggested, however, that the Supreme Court has too often
engaged in judicial activism, i.e., that it has too often acted in
countermajoritarian ways. Many disputes, it is argued, would be better
resolved through the political process than in the courts.11 Even with regard to
racial discrimination, conservatives in particular have argued that advocates of
racial equality too often rely upon judicial, rather than political, remedies.12
Simultaneously, post-racialism has become the dominant cultural narrative
regarding racial inequality.13 Post-racialism posits that racial minorities’
societal gains combined with the presumed absence of contemporary
discrimination against them render measures explicitly aimed at redressing
racial inequality both unnecessary and counterproductive. It is argued that such
measures cause, rather than cure, racial divisiveness and resentment.14 The
and arguing that judicial review “yields remarkably majoritarian results[] and is a process that is different from
majoritarian politics but nonetheless responsive to it”).
10 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that laws
classifying on the basis of race, alienage, and national origin are subject to strict scrutiny because “[t]hese
factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy” and “because such discrimination is unlikely to
be soon rectified by legislative means”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)
(stating that strict scrutiny should only apply when the class at issue is “saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”).
11 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for striking down a Texas law criminalizing homosexual conduct but stating that he “ha[s] nothing against
homosexuals, or any other group, promoting their agenda through normal democratic means”).
12 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (“[The petitioner’s] arguments are best
presented to the legislative bodies. It is not the responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to
determine the appropriate punishment for particular crimes. It is the legislatures, the elected representatives of
the people, that are ‘constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people.’”
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (per curiam))).
13 See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1594 (2009) (describing post-racialism as
reflecting the “belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the state need not engage in
race-based decision-making or adopt race-based remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a
central organizing principle of social action”).
14 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that affirmative action programs “engender attitudes of superiority
or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the
government’s use of race”).
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post-racialist worldview holds that very little discrimination against minorities
occurs today, that any discrimination that does occur is aberrational, and that
adopting remedial measures to combat the actions of a few bigots is a cure
worse than the disease.15
This Essay, while addressing both post-racialism and countermajoritarian
criticisms of judicial action protecting racial minorities, does not attempt to
resolve those debates. Rather, my primary goal is to illuminate the dangers of
what I believe to be a coming convergence between those two ideas in
constitutional doctrine and discourse. If post-racialism is assumed to be
descriptively accurate, then racial minorities should be able to achieve their
goals through the political process, rather than through the courts. And if the
countermajoritarian critique has force in this context, then it is preferable that
they do so.
The Court’s decisions therefore seek to push racial minorities away from
vindicating their goals in the courts and toward doing so through the political
process. For example, the Court’s equal protection doctrine requires proof of
subjective discriminatory intent on the part of an identifiable government actor
to trigger heightened judicial scrutiny.16 This requirement means that the Equal
Protection Clause will be unavailing as a remedy for any but the most
egregious and obvious instances of racial discrimination and inequality.
Procedural hurdles compound the litigation-discouraging effect of the Court’s
substantive equal protection doctrine. For example, the Court’s recent
decisions requiring greater factual specificity in pleading federal civil claims
mean that, in addition to the difficulties in proving subjective discriminatory
15 Both of the premises described above are subject to contestation on normative and descriptive grounds.
Whether it would be better for remedies for racial inequality to be achieved through the political process than
through the courts depends upon what we mean by “better”: faster, more effective, more permanent, etc. As for
post-racialism, the prescriptive power of its major premise—that we should less often explicitly seek racial
justice—is dependent to a large degree on the descriptive force of its minor premises. If more racial
discrimination exists than post-racialists would have us believe, or if one believes that individual instances of
bigotry are only part of racial injustice, or if post-racialists overestimate the divisiveness that measures
addressing racial inequality cause, then the post-racialist worldview loses much of its appeal.
16 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (holding, in a case involving an equal protection challenge to racial
disparities in capital punishment, that the requirement of discriminatory purpose means proof that the decision
maker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group” (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (rejecting an equal
protection challenge to a qualifying test administered to applicants to the police academy and holding that,
absent proof of discriminatory purpose, even a substantial racially disparate impact “does not trigger the rule
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest
of considerations” (citation omitted)).
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motive at trial, plaintiffs now have to plead specific facts in the complaint
showing that motive.17 Because plaintiffs will seldom have access to
information regarding a defendant’s subjective state of mind prior to discovery,
presumably fewer equal protection claims will survive motions to dismiss, or
fewer such claims will be brought in the first place.18 Similarly, the Court’s
increasingly restrictive standing doctrine raises the bar for many would-be
equal protection litigants to nearly unattainable heights.19
The fact that litigation has become an increasingly ineffective means for
advancing substantive equality in any systematic or structural way could be
defensible if, in pushing racial minorities out of the courthouse door, one
believed they could (and should) instead turn to the political process. Yet the
Supreme Court’s colorblindness doctrine has made it exceedingly difficult for
racial minorities to actually achieve their goals through the political process.
As will be discussed in the following Part of this Essay, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly and aggressively struck down racial minorities’ successful use of
the political process to advance their goals. Thus, having explicitly counseled
and implicitly required advocates for racial justice to work through the political
process and having suggested that no real barriers remain to them doing so, the
Court has simultaneously rendered that process unavailing or, at the very least,
severely constrained.20

17 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (holding, in a case alleging racial and religious
discrimination, that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient factual specificity in his complaint regarding the
defendant’s subjective state of mind to make his claim sufficiently “plausible” in light of the judge’s “common
sense” to survive a motion to dismiss).
18 See Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism
Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (2010) (“Under Iqbal, [discrimination]
claims require a showing of animus or deliberate, invidious intent, which is less likely at the stage where there
are the fewest facts available, particularly in cases characterized by stark informational asymmetries between
the parties.”).
19 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (holding that parents of African-American publicschool students lacked standing to pursue a claim alleging that the IRS improperly failed to terminate the taxexempt status of racially discriminatory private schools); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge a suburban ordinance barring the construction of low- and moderateincome housing because they had not adequately proven causation, failing, inter alia, to allege that they would
have been able to afford to live in the suburb even absent the ordinance). Importantly, the Court’s disdain for
equal protection claims by racial minorities has gone hand in hand with its special solicitude for claims of
“reverse discrimination” by white plaintiffs. For further discussion of this issue, see William M. Carter, Jr.,
Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2011).
20 As discussed below, this is not a new phenomenon. However, the Court’s willingness to strike down
laws when minorities have achieved their goals through the political process has increased as the Court has
grown more conservative.
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The post-racialist position on judicial review depends heavily upon false
assumptions regarding minority political power. This Essay interrogates those
assumptions and argues that they are based largely on sporadic electoral
success (of which the election of President Obama is but the most obvious
example), rather than systemic minority political empowerment. Such
successes are then used as evidence of the descriptive accuracy of postracialism. The symbolic legitimacy of such successes is further used as a
reason for suspicion of the effective exercise of minority political power, i.e.,
to suggest that racial minorities have reached a place of such political
empowerment that democratic action addressing racial inequality should be as
constitutionally suspect as laws subordinating racial minorities. I call this
model of judicial review “whitened scrutiny.”
As discussed below, the Carolene Products justifications for heightened
scrutiny21 all depend to a greater or lesser extent on presumed defects in
majoritarian processes that lead to the enactment of laws burdening
unprivileged groups. Under whitened scrutiny, the Court assumes the
applicability of this same reasoning from evidence of racial minorities’
increasing but still marginal political representation. For the Court—and a
substantial number of Americans—majoritarian processes today are considered
to be as likely to result in discrimination against whites as against racial
minorities. As a recent study has found, many white Americans view racism
as a zero-sum game, such that decreases in perceived bias against
Blacks [since the Civil Rights Era] are associated with increases in
perceived bias against Whites—a relationship not observed in
Blacks’ perceptions. Moreover, these changes in Whites’ conceptions
of racism are extreme enough that Whites have now come to view
22
anti-White bias as a bigger societal problem than anti-Black bias.

To the extent that the Court’s doctrine generally reflects the popular consensus
on controversial social issues,23 the Court’s current equal protection
jurisprudence seems to be in step with public opinion.
21

304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game that They Are Now
Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 215 (2011); accord Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Let’s Rescue the Race
Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, at A19 (citing polling data from a survey by the Public Religion Research
Institute in which 48% of whites, 32% of Hispanics, and 30% of blacks agreed with the statement that
“discrimination against whites has become as big a problem as discrimination against blacks and other
minorities”).
23 See generally PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds.,
2008) (collecting public opinion data regarding constitutional controversies).
22
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL COLORBLINDNESS AS A BARRIER TO DEMOCRATIC
ACTION
The Supreme Court’s current equal protection jurisprudence holds that any
governmental consideration of race is presumptively unconstitutional.24 The
Court has held that this is the case regardless of whether the government’s
action is aimed at aiding or injuring historically subordinated groups.25
However, the process-defect rationale for strict judicial scrutiny of government
action is generally inapplicable with regard to laws aimed at remedying the
subordination of historically oppressed groups. For example, the processdefect rationale assumes that the disadvantaged group has been effectively shut
out of the political process due to a combination of its small size and prejudice
against it.26 This rationale would not, for example, justify heightened judicial
suspicion of affirmative action measures. Such measures are not adopted by a
politically empowered majority group to the detriment of politically
disempowered racial minority groups. To the contrary, such measures are
enacted by and with the support of a political majority that has freely chosen to
act in the pursuit of what it sees as the greater good. Should that majority
change its mind, it would be able to remedy the situation through the political
process.27
The Court has nonetheless explicitly and implicitly relied upon processdefect reasoning in many equal protection cases challenging affirmative action
programs and other race-conscious measures. The Court’s conservative
Justices have been highly suspicious of the effective exercise of minority
political power. The unstated assumption seems to be that political action that
actually achieves a minority group’s substantive goals is equally as suspicious
from a process-defect perspective as that of a majority group acting to

24 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“[A]ll racial classifications [imposed by
government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
25 See id. (“We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial
classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions policies, race-based preferences in government
contracts, and race-based districting intended to improve minority representation.” (citations omitted)).
26 See ELY, supra note 8.
27 Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that,
“[i]f one aspect of the judiciary’s role under the Equal Protection Clause is to protect ‘discrete and insular
minorities’ from majoritarian prejudice or indifference, some maintain that these concerns are not implicated
when the ‘white majority’ places burdens upon itself,” but rejecting that argument on the facts of the case
(citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938))).

CARTER GALLEYS3

1130

8/9/2012 11:02 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:1123

disadvantage a minority group. The following sections demonstrate this fear of
minority political power in action.
A. The Beginning of the Court’s Suspicion of Minority Political Power: City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.28 was the first affirmative action case
wherein the Court expressly grounded its equal protection analysis on
suspicion of the exercise of minority political power. To understand the
problems with the Croson Court’s reasoning, some background is in order. The
British colonial institution of slavery began in Virginia in 1619.29 Although it
was a slaveholding state, Virginia, like other states in the “Upper South,” had
by the time of the Civil War become less dependent on slavery and therefore
less extreme and more amenable to compromise with the Union than some
other slaveholding states.30 During the Reconstruction Era after the Civil War,
gains were made in Virginia toward ending state-sponsored racial
subjugation.31 Virginia’s pre-war stance as a relatively moderate Southern state
did not survive the post-Reconstruction period of racial retrenchment,
however. Virginia emerged as one of the leaders of the Jim Crow Era, adopting
a variety of laws aimed at maintaining white supremacy.32 During the civil
rights movement of the 1940s–1960s, Virginia veered between the virulent
“Massive Resistance” to racial integration emblemized by politicians such as
Senator Harry F. Byrd33 and more moderate (yet still segregationist) responses
to demands for equality.34
The City of Richmond shared the state’s complicated racial history.
Richmond was the capital of the Confederacy during most of the Civil War.35
28
29
30

J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469.
See Tim Hashaw, The First Black Americans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 29, 2007, at 63, 63.
See Daniel W. Crofts, Late Antebellum Virginia Reconsidered, 107 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 253

(1999).
31 See Jeff R. Kerr-Ritchie, Black Republicans in the Virginia Tobacco Fields, 1867–70, 86 J. NEGRO
HIST. 12 (2001) (discussing the improvements in labor laws, education rights, and political access for AfricanAmericans).
32 See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS SMITH, MANAGING WHITE SUPREMACY: RACE, POLITICS, AND CITIZENSHIP IN
JIM CROW VIRGINIA 24–28 (2002) (describing the adoption of literacy tests, poll taxes, and statewide Jim
Crow laws from the late 1800s to the early 1900s).
33 See Massive Resistance, VA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/massiveresistance.
htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
34 See Passive Resistance, VA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.vahistorical.org/civilrights/passiveresistance.
htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
35 See EMORY M. THOMAS, THE CONFEDERATE STATE OF RICHMOND: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CAPITAL
(La. State Univ. Press 1998) (1971).
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Black labor was critical to the building (and, after the war, rebuilding) of the
City.36 White business owners, however, colluded with the city government to
systematically
exclude
African-Americans
from
entrepreneurial
opportunities.37 Moreover, although Richmond always had a substantial
African-American population, blacks were effectively locked out of city
government until the 1970s, when, due to white flight, they became a majority
of Richmond’s population.38 In 1978, newly empowered black voters and their
allies elected Richmond’s first African-American mayor and a city council in
which blacks were a bare majority (five of nine council members).39 Seeking to
redress the history of African-Americans’ exclusion from the construction
industry, the city council in 1983 adopted a five-year affirmative action plan,
under which businesses contracting with the City had to subcontract at least
30% of a contract’s value to minority business enterprises.40 The plaintiff in
Croson challenged the plan as violating the Equal Protection Clause.41
The Supreme Court found the City’s actions unconstitutional.42 Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Croson reduced the complex history of racial
politics in Richmond described above to a simple case of “reverse
discrimination” by black government officials against innocent whites.43 While
Croson’s reasoning purported to rest on equal protection principles of general
applicability, the plurality clearly believed there was something particularly
suspicious about the adoption of the plan at issue. The plurality opinion relied
heavily on process-defect reasoning by emphasizing the fact that the plan was
adopted by a city council having a black majority.44 To quote from the opinion
at some length:

36 See Peter Charles Hoffer, “Blind to History”: The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another
Look at City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 289 (1992) (“Richmond was built,
repaired, and rebuilt by minority labor.”).
37 Id. at 289–91.
38 Id. at 290.
39 Id. at 290–91.
40 Id. at 289.
41 488 U.S. 469, 483 (1989).
42 See id. at 505–06.
43 Id. at 495–96 (plurality opinion).
44 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 50 (2010) (“In Croson, the Court relied on the great John Hart Ely to hold that a
minority set-aside program was more constitutionally suspect because it had been enacted by a black-majority
city council.”). It appears that the insinuation of a heavy-handed black majority discriminating against white
citizens was first made in appellee Croson’s brief. See Brief on Behalf of the Appellee at 8, J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (No. 87-998) (“The vote in favor of adopting the Plan was along racial lines with the five black
members and one of the four white members of the Council voting for it.”).
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Even were we to accept a reading of the guarantee of equal
protection under which the level of scrutiny varies according to the
ability of different groups to defend their interests in the
representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate
in the circumstances of this case. One of the central arguments for
applying a less exacting standard to “benign” racial classifications is
that such measures essentially involve a choice made by dominant
racial groups to disadvantage themselves. . . .
In this case, [however,] blacks constitute approximately 50% of
the population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the
city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority
will more easily act to the disadvantage of a minority based on
unwarranted assumptions or incomplete facts would seem to militate
for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scrutiny in this
45
case.

Notice the plurality’s equation of numbers with political dominance and of
political dominance with a process defect. Because blacks were 50% of the
City’s population and held 55% of the seats on the city council, they were, in
the Court’s view, the “dominant” racial group. And because blacks were
dominant, the plurality reasoned, strict scrutiny was appropriate to protect the
disenfranchised minority (whites) that was unable to vindicate its goals
through the political process.
The Croson plurality’s reliance on process-defect reasoning not only
discounts the history described above but defies logic and the
contemporaneous political reality. Percentage of the City’s population tells us
little about political dominance. Given the relatively lower voter-registration
and turnout rates in minority communities, it is highly likely that blacks,
although 50% of the City’s population, accounted for substantially less than
50% of the registered and actual voters. Thus, even if the black community
voted as a bloc (another unstated assumption), at least some of the black citycouncil members must have enjoyed substantial support from nonblack voters.
Moreover, the plurality’s recitation of the facts ignores that one of the white
city-council members voted in favor of the affirmative action plan.46 Finally,
the plurality’s reasoning assumes that white voters could not have vindicated
their interests through the political process. At most, the actual facts of the case
would justify a presumption that black voters in Richmond were in a position
to use the political process to remedy the legacy of discrimination against them
45
46

J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 495–96 (plurality opinion).
See Brief on Behalf of the Appellee, supra note 44, at 8.
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by the City of Richmond, not that white voters in Richmond were being
subordinated by a domineering black majority.
The Croson plurality’s reasoning reflects a deep concern about the effective
exercise of minority political power. Croson, however, is less extreme in at
least one way than the Court’s more recent colorblindness cases, which are
discussed below. In Croson, a tangible benefit was conferred upon members of
certain racial groups. As Heather Gerken has noted, the objection to
government action like that in Croson seems to be that the political majority
has used its power to engage in unseemly racial self-dealing.47 It is therefore at
least understandable that concerns about racial patronage might justify
heightened judicial scrutiny of the political process in a case like Croson.48 In
the cases discussed in the following sections, however, no such concerns were
present. Those cases—Ricci v. DeStefano and NAMUDNO—therefore
represent a qualitative step forward in the Court’s post-racialist jurisprudence.
B. Fear of a Black Pastor49: Ricci v. DeStefano
Ricci v. DeStefano50 reflects the Court’s growing suspicion of the exercise
of minority political power in and of itself. Ricci involved the City of New
Haven’s efforts to prevent the near-total exclusion of blacks and Latinos from
promotion to supervisory positions in the City’s fire department.51 By way of
background, African-Americans and Latinos were approximately 60% of the
City’s population at the time.52 While blacks and Latinos held 46% of the
City’s firefighting positions overall, they held only 18% of the captain and
lieutenant positions in the fire department.53 This lack of representation did not
arise in a vacuum. Rather, police and fire departments around the country, and
specifically in New Haven, remained bastions of racial homogeneity well into
the late twentieth century.54 This was due in part to the perception of public47

Gerken, supra note 44, at 54.
As Professor Gerken also noted, however, where the political process results in the perpetuation of
white privilege, “[t]he Court routinely dismisses pork and patronage as the usual products of pluralist politics
under rational basis review. Yet it was markedly alert to the problem of self-dealing in Croson when racial
minorities ruled.” Id. (footnote omitted).
49 The subsection title is a reference to the hip-hop group Public Enemy’s seminal album Fear of a Black
Planet.
50 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
51 Id. at 2664.
52 Id. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 2691.
54 See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimination, Racing
Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 88–89 (2010) (“[New Haven] had been repeatedly and successfully sued
48
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safety forces as agents of law and order and to the reluctance of many
individuals to see persons of color as wielders of such state power, rather than
the subjects of it.55 Municipal police and fire departments also have long
histories of perpetuating disproportionate access for white ethnic groups to
positions in those departments.56
The lawsuit in Ricci centered on a qualifying exam the City administered
for promotions to the rank of lieutenant or captain in the fire department.57 The
test, in conjunction with civil service rules and union agreements governing
promotions, resulted in significant racial disparities in who would be eligible
for promotion.58 Out of the seventy-seven firefighters who took the lieutenant’s
exam, all of those who would have been eligible for immediate promotion
were white.59 Out of the forty-one firefighters who took the captain’s exam, all
of those who would have been eligible for immediate promotion were white
except for two Latinos.60 No blacks were eligible for immediate promotion to
either captain or lieutenant.61
Once this racial disparity became apparent, the City’s counsel advised that
all promotions be put on hold until the City could explore “whether there
[we]re other ways to test for . . . those [promotions] that [we]re equally valid

by African Americans and Latinos over its hiring and promotional practices—virtually all facially race
neutral—that operated to shut nonwhites out. . . . Overt and intentional racial exclusion and segregation
remained pervasive in many urban fire departments even decades after Brown.”).
55 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 372 (1987) (“[W]hites are not accustomed to seeing blacks in
positions of authority or power. . . . [M]any individuals in our culture continue to resist and resent taking
orders from blacks.”).
56 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In making hiring and promotion decisions,
public employers often ‘rel[ied] on criteria unrelated to job performance,’ including nepotism or political
patronage. Such flawed selection methods served to entrench preexisting racial hierarchies.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972))); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: A
Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 581, 588–95 (2010) (tracing the history of exclusion
of white women and racial minorities from firefighting jobs in New Haven and other urban fire departments,
and the resultant desegregation and discrimination lawsuits); The Ladder, SLATE (June 25, 2009, 7:17 AM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2221250/entry/2221298/ (“[A]s New Haven’s black population swelled [beginning in
the 1960s and 1970s], the city’s Irish, Italian, and Polish residents held tight to power and dug in over hiring in
the fire department.”).
57 129 S. Ct. at 2664.
58 Id. at 2665–66.
59 Id. at 2666.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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with less adverse [racial] impact.”62 His legal concern was that proceeding
with promotions could give rise to liability under the disparate impact
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.63 City officials also had
political concerns. New Haven’s pattern of racial discrimination in the fire
department had previously prompted lawsuits and public outrage.64 As in the
past, black and Latino firefighters would have had a reasonable prima facie
claim of disparate impact liability had the promotion process at issue in Ricci
gone forward, given the level of the racial disparity.65 On this occasion,
however, minority firefighters and their allies chose—at least initially—to seek
political redress, rather than file a lawsuit.
The City held a series of public hearings at which individuals spoke on
both sides of the issue. Firefighters as well as members of the general public
urged the Civil Service Commission not to make any promotions because of
concerns about unfairness and racial exclusion.66 A local minister, Reverend
Boise Kimber, emerged as one of the most vocal opponents of going forward
with the promotions.67 Reverend Kimber, in addition to being an influential
minister and community activist, was also a member of the New Haven Board
of Fire Commissioners, which set rules and regulations for the fire
department.68 Reverend Kimber “adamantly opposed certification of the test
results” because of their racially disparate impact.69 At the conclusion of the

62 Id. at 2669–70 (second alteration in original) (quoting Joint Appendix at 140, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658
(Nos. 07-1428, 08-328)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
63 Id. Title VII prohibits both disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (racial
disparities caused by facially neutral employment practices). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
64 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2691 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the prior litigation involving New
Haven’s fire department); Harris & West-Faulcon, supra note 54, at 89–91 (same).
65 Indeed, the disparate impact lawsuits that the city counsel feared manifested immediately after the
Supreme Court mandated that the City proceed with the racially exclusionary promotions in Ricci. Black
firefighters filed two disparate impact lawsuits once those promotions were made. See William Kaempffer,
Black Firefighter Files Federal Bias Suit, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 16, 2009, at A1; William Kaempffer, City
Facing More Suits from Firefighters, NEW HAVEN REG., Nov. 13, 2009, at A3.
66 Lieutenant Gary Kinney, for example, stated that basing promotions on the results of this test would be
“a slap in the face” to the firefighters who did not receive passing scores, because he believed the material
tested was not sufficiently pertinent to firefighting in New Haven. Joint Appendix, supra note 62, at 44–45. He
continued, “this test showing that no minorities passed” is “not going to work. It’s going to cause more
[divisiveness].” Id. at 46.
67 See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2684–85 (Alito, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 2684. As Justice Ginsburg noted, the Board of Fire Commissioners was a separate and
independent body from the Civil Service Board, which made the decision regarding the promotions. Id. at
2709 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2685–86 (Alito, J., concurring).
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hearings, the City ultimately decided not to certify the results, leading to no
promotions being made.70
The disappointed firefighters sued, alleging that the City’s actions violated
the disparate treatment provisions of Title VII because they were race
conscious.71 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that of Title VII’s two
prongs—disparate impact and disparate treatment—the latter generally trumps
the former.72 Borrowing from its affirmative action jurisprudence under the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court held that Title VII generally prohibits an
employer from voluntarily “tak[ing] adverse employment actions because of an
individual’s race”73 to correct for a cognizable disparate impact on persons of a
different race.74 Rather, the employer must prove not only that the business
practice at issue causes a substantial racial disparity but also that the employer
has a strong basis in evidence to believe it would lose a disparate impact
lawsuit if one were brought.75
Given that no promotions were made, there was no formal unequal
treatment in Ricci.76 Contrary to the popular narrative of the case, the plaintiffs
70 Id. at 2671 (majority opinion). The City’s Civil Service Board was responsible for certifying the list of
applicants who passed the test, from which the candidates for promotion would be chosen. Id. at 2665. At the
end of a series of public hearings, the Board split 2–2 with regard to whether to certify the test results, with the
consequence that the list was not certified and no promotions could be made. Id. at 2671.
71 See id. at 2664.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 2673.
74 See id. at 2675 (“[In the context of the Equal Protection Clause, t]he Court has held that certain
government actions to remedy past racial discrimination . . . are constitutional only where there is a ‘strong
basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were necessary. . . . Our cases discussing constitutional principles
can provide helpful guidance in this statutory context.” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 500 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Scalia went further, suggesting in his
concurrence that disparate impact statutes may be unconstitutional. See id. at 2682–83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
He argued that the theory of disparate impact liability requires employers to act in a race-conscious manner
because, to avoid or remedy a racially disparate impact, one must first notice the racial disparity and
subsequently take action to correct it. See id. at 2682. Justice Scalia suggested that, because the Court’s equal
protection precedents generally prohibit the government itself from acting in a race-conscious manner, it may
also be unconstitutional for the government to require others to do so. See id. at 2682–83.
75 Id. at 2678 (majority opinion). As the Court explained, a prima facie Title VII disparate impact case is
established by the existence of a statistically significant racial disparity. Id. Such a disparity does not
automatically prove disparate impact liability, however; it is only the first step. As the Court explained, “[T]he
City could be liable for disparate-impact discrimination only if the examinations were not job related and
consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative that
served the City’s needs but that the City refused to adopt.” Id.
76 See id. at 2696 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[City officials] were no doubt conscious of race . . . , but
this did not mean they had engaged in racially disparate treatment. . . . ‘[A]ll the test results were discarded, no
one was promoted, and firefighters of every race will have to participate in another selection process to be
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in Ricci were not deprived of a vested right to promotion.77 At best, they—like
all the other firefighters—were deprived of the opportunity to be considered
for promotions at that time based on the results of that test.78 Thus, Ricci
differs from a case like Croson, which involved a traditional affirmative action
plan.79
The Court’s ruling showed deep suspicion of black political power. Most
fundamentally, the Court mistakenly “equate[d] political considerations with
unlawful discrimination.”80 The Court essentially found that successful black
political advocacy that temporarily prevented the perpetuation of racial
exclusion amounted to reverse discrimination against whites. It reached this
conclusion despite the fact that no promotions were made at all and the fact
that making the promotions likely would have violated then-existing law.81 In
essence, Ricci treats a racial minority group’s success in using ordinary politics
to prevent its continued subordination and exclusion as presumptively illegal.
Justice Alito’s concurrence made plain his view that whites in New Haven
needed judicial protection from black political power. In his view, the City
refused to certify the test results not to avoid Title VII liability—or even to
considered for promotion.’” (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142,
158 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658); see also Helen
Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197, 245 (2010) (“Mr. Ricci was not treated differently than any other firefighter based on race,
and in fact was not treated differently than any other firefighter at all: the test results were discarded for all,
regardless of race, and no one was promoted, regardless of race.”). Indeed, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim in Ricci in part because no unequal treatment occurred. Ricci, 554 F. Supp.
2d at 161.
77 See Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (“[P]erforming well on the exam does not create an entitlement to
promotion . . . .”).
78 See id. at 160 (“Even [if the Civil Service Board had certified the test results], application of the [civil
service rules] would [only] give top scorers an opportunity for promotion, depending on the number of
vacancies, but no guarantee of promotion; it is even conceivable that the applicant with the highest score never
would be promoted.”).
79 As Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent, it is for this reason that the “litigation d[id] not involve
affirmative action” as traditionally defined. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The equal
protection cases from which the Ricci Court drew the strong-basis-in-evidence standard all involved
affirmative action measures by which the government distributed a tangible benefit on the basis of race.
80 Id. at 2709.
81 Id. at 2673 (majority opinion). Prior to Ricci’s novel application of the strong-basis-in-evidence
standard to Title VII claims, an employer faced with evidence of a statistically significant racial disparity could
voluntarily take corrective action to prevent that disparity from occurring without being subject to disparate
treatment liability. See Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]here an exam that
discriminates against a group or groups of persons is reviewed, studied and changed in order to eliminate, or at
the very least, alleviate such discrimination, there is a complete absence of intentional discrimination.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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level the playing field—but instead to please the black community.82 For
Justice Alito, the City’s actions were grounded solely in “a simple desire to
please a politically important racial constituency.”83 Even assuming this were
true, nowhere does Justice Alito’s opinion explain why this is a forbidden goal
in politics.84 Indeed, as explained in Part I above, the Court’s conservative
members’ repeated calls for subordinated groups to use the political process to
achieve their goals assumes that doing so is not only permissible but desirable.
Justice Alito’s narrative of the facts, moreover, emphasized what he saw as
the sinister role of a single African-American minister whom he believed
subverted the political process. Justice Alito, selectively quoting the district
court’s opinion, implied that “city officials worked behind the scenes to
sabotage the promotional examinations because they knew that, were the
exams certified, the Mayor would incur the wrath of [Rev. Boise] Kimber and
other influential leaders of New Haven’s African-American community.”85 It
seems unlikely that Justice Alito’s imagery of radical black “wrath” and
“sabotage” was merely an unfortunate choice of words. The characterization of
the black community’s successful political advocacy as dangerous and
subversive reflects a worldview in which the normal tools of politics—
vigilance, agitation, and the threat of political repercussions—are ominous
when successfully wielded by persons of color.86 It is supremely ironic that the
Ricci Court condemned black ethnic politics for successfully interrupting the
82

Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2688 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.
84 After all, the fact “[t]hat political officials would have politics in mind is hardly extraordinary, and
there are many ways in which a politician can attempt to win over a constituency—including a racial
constituency—without engaging in unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 2709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 2684 (Alito, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d
142, 162 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d per curiam, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658) (internal
quotation mark omitted). Justice Alito failed to quote the remainder of this portion of the district court’s
opinion, which stated that, even if a jury could draw such an inference, “the fact that defendants desired to
avoid the wrath of one group (in this case African-American firefighters and other political supporters of
Kimber and DeStefano) does not logically lead to the conclusion that defendants intended to discriminate or
retaliate against plaintiffs because they were not members of that group.” Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
86 Whatever can be said about Reverend Kimber as an individual, finding it suspicious or even
particularly unusual that a black minister would loudly and even disruptively protest what he saw as
discrimination against his community reflects a deep unfamiliarity with the role of the black church in the
politics of racial justice. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Separation of Church and Self, 46 SMU L. REV. 585,
588–89 (1992) (“The battle for racial equality . . . was a mass movement . . . . And yet, the movement’s
support base for much of its existence was in the church. The leaders of the mass-protest wing were drawn
from the black clergy, which continues to supply a disproportionate share of the civil rights leadership.”); see
also Emily Bazelon, Ricci’s Competing Story Lines, SLATE (June 29, 2009, 2:09 PM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2220927/entry/2221780 (“Boise Kimber has plenty of unsavory bits in his past. Alito runs through many of
them. Because in his view, the evil to be protected against in New Haven is black political power.”).
83
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perpetuation of racial exclusion brought about by white ethnic politics, while
leaving the latter wholly unexamined.
C. Fear of a Black Vote: Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number
One v. Holder87
If Croson and Ricci are supportable from the perspective of the
countermajoritarian difficulty, it cannot be because blacks were so politically
dominant in either Richmond or New Haven that whites were effectively a
disenfranchised minority. But perhaps judicial suspicion of the political
process could be justified in those cases because of the level of government
involved. Local governments are thought to be distinctly dangerous sites for
government decision making based upon race because local governments are
less broadly representative than the national government and therefore more
subject to racially distorted politics.88 Even if that were true in Ricci and
Croson, however, the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO shows that it considers
minority political power equally suspicious at the national level.
NAMUDNO involved a challenge to the constitutionality of section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as renewed in 2006.89 Section 5 requires that
certain covered jurisdictions obtain preclearance from the federal government
prior to the enforcement of any changes to their voting practices or
procedures.90 Congress adopted this provision as a prophylactic measure to
supplement the other provisions of the Act, which allow for case-by-case
litigation of discrimination in voting.91 By requiring federal oversight of any
changes in voting procedures by those jurisdictions found to have engaged in

87

129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (noting that there is a “heightened
danger of oppression from political factions in small, rather than large, political units” and that, “as a matter of
‘social reality and governmental theory,’ the Federal Government is unlikely to be captured by minority racial
or ethnic groups and used as an instrument of discrimination” (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 522–23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted)),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
89 129 S. Ct. at 2508. The Voting Rights Act contains a sunset provision providing that section 5 shall
expire if not renewed by a given date. See id. at 2510 (“As enacted, §§ 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were
temporary provisions. They were expected to be in effect for only five years. . . . Congress reauthorized the
Act in 1970 (for 5 years), 1975 (for 7 years), and 1982 (for 25 years). . . . Most recently, in 2006, Congress
extended § 5 for yet another 25 years.”).
90 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). The covered jurisdictions are mostly, but not exclusively, located in
the South.
91 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
88
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systematic voting discrimination in the past, Congress “decide[d] to shift the
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”92
The lawsuit in NAMUDNO was brought by a municipal utility district
located in Texas, a covered jurisdiction.93 The District had an elected board
and believed that it should not be subject to the preclearance requirement
before it could make changes to its election procedures.94 In the normal course
of events, it is unlikely that a small municipal utility district would expend the
effort and expense necessary to mount a constitutional challenge and litigate it
all the way to the Supreme Court. Indeed, as noted by the district court in
NAMUDNO:
Throughout its two decades of existence, the District has filed only
eight preclearance requests, and the cost of these submissions—$223
per year—is modest, especially when compared to the District’s
average annual budget of $548,338. . . . [M]oreover, the District has
never received an objection letter or been targeted by a section 5
enforcement suit. Nor has the District identified a single voting
change that it considered but chose not to pursue because of
95
section 5.

The Utility District in NAMUDNO, however, was luckier than most plaintiffs.
Although opposed by the county in which it was located,96 it had the good
fortune of being represented by (among others) the Project on Fair
Representation, a conservative litigation firm whose mission is ending
affirmative action and other governmental measures aimed at increasing
diversity or integration.97 The District’s post-racial argument that the level of
black political success today renders section 5 both unnecessary and
92

Id.
Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey (NAMUDNO), 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223 (D.D.C.
2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
94 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2508.
95 573 F. Supp. 2d at 282 (citations omitted).
96 See id. at 278 (“[F]or the County, the modest administrative costs that come with being subject to
Section 5’s preclearance requirements are far outweighed by the benefits that come from such coverage.”
(quoting Travis County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, with Accompanying Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 7, NAMUDNO, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (No. 06-1384))).
97 See Current Litigation, PROJECT ON FAIR REPRESENTATION, http://www.projectonfairrepresentation.
org/current-litigation/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2012). Despite the euphemistic language on its website and in its
press releases, it is clear from the Project’s actual litigation and briefs filed therein that its goal is to attack
race-conscious measures adopted for remedial or diversifying purposes. The Project, for example, was also
involved in litigating the successful equal protection challenge to school districts’ voluntary school-integration
efforts in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). See
Current Litigation, supra.
93
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unconstitutional was presented front and center in the first paragraph of its
brief:
In the past 44 years, nearly every facet of voting rights has
changed in America. Voter registration, voter turnout, and
representation in electoral offices have increased dramatically among
African Americans, Hispanics, and other minorities. The country has
its first African-American president, who received a larger
percentage of the white vote than each of the previous two
98
Democratic presidential nominees.

The Court, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, sidestepped
the constitutional issues and resolved the case on statutory grounds.99 But in
lengthy dicta clearly intended as a warning to Congress, Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion strongly signaled that several members of the Court, if not
yet a majority, are prepared to find section 5 unconstitutional. The Court stated
that section 5 “raise[s] serious constitutional questions”100 in an opinion
suffused with post-racialist assumptions about minority political power. The
opinion reasoned that section 5 may no longer be necessary because “[t]hings
have changed in the South. Voter turnout and registration rates now approach
parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And
minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”101 After offering only
the briefest of nods to the fact these improvements are due in no small part to
section 5,102 Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion then used evidence of minority
political success as reason for suspicion of the fruits thereof. In the Chief
Justice’s view, the “dramatic improvement[]” in minority access to the vote
undermined the justification for section 5’s continued existence.103 Indeed,
under this view, the overwhelming majorities in Congress by which section 5
was reenacted in 2006 (390–33 in the House and 98–0 in the Senate104) serve
not as reason for upholding it, but for striking it down. If racial minorities are
powerful enough to have such legislation enacted, then why do they need it?

98

Appellant’s Brief at 1, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322).
See NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513–17. The Court, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
ruled as a matter of statutory interpretation that the District was entitled to seek “bailout” from section 5’s
preclearance requirement and that it was therefore unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues. Id.
100 Id. at 2513.
101 Id. at 2511.
102 See id. (“These improvements are no doubt due in significant part to the Voting Rights Act itself, and
stand as a monument to its success. Past success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the
preclearance requirements.”).
103 Id. at 2511–12.
104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (No. 08-322).
99
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Furthermore, for some of the Justices, such successful political advocacy
by racial minorities is reason for the same kind of suspicion displayed in Ricci:
the intuition that racial intimidation, rather than legitimate and ordinary
politics, was at work. The following excerpt from the oral argument in
NAMUDNO is illustrative:
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . . What was the vote on this 2006 extension—
98 to nothing in the Senate, and what was it in the House? Was—
[COUNSEL]: It was—it was 33 to 390, I believe.
JUSTICE SCALIA: 33 to 390. You know, the—the Israeli Supreme
Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule that if the death penalty was
pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must be
something wrong there. Do you ever expect—do you ever seriously
expect Congress to vote against a reextension of the Voting Rights
Act? Do you really think that any incumbent would—would vote to
105
do that?

Justice Thomas would have gone farther than the majority and held
section 5 unconstitutional. For Justice Thomas, the time has come for racial
minorities to cease to be the “special favorite[s] of the law[]”106 with regard to
105 Id. at 47–48. Justice Scalia was echoing the contemporary conservative movement’s suspicion of the
politics behind the reauthorization of section 5. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Voting Rights Act Under Siege,
POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2012, 7:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73058.html (“An intensifying
conservative legal assault on [section 5 of] the Voting Rights Act [is taking place] . . . . [T]he view that states
should have free rein to change their election laws even in places with a history of Jim Crow seems to be
gaining traction within the Republican Party.”); see also Edward Blum, An Insulting Provision, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE (May 2, 2006, 6:42 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/217511/insulting-provision/edwardblum (“[T]he Republican congressional leadership, cheered on by the Bush Administration, is hell-bent on
keeping [section 5] in place. . . . Republicans don’t want to be branded as hostile to minorities, especially just
months from an election.”). Like the majority in Ricci, Justice Scalia did not explain why enacting legislation
to please this particular constituency must be seen as particularly unprincipled or suspicious, as compared to
legislative action undertaken to please other important and politically active constituencies, such as gun
owners and the elderly.
106 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court held that
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial segregation in places of public accommodation, exceeded
Congress’s power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. In NAMUDNO, Justice Thomas argued that
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act exceeded Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 129 S. Ct.
at 2517 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Nor is Justice Thomas alone in
this regard; Chief Justice Roberts clearly also believes that the time for racial remediation has passed. See
Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009, at 42, 42–44 (“[I]n a series of decisions
in the past four years, the Chief Justice has expressed the view that the time has now passed when the Court
should allow systemic remedies for racial discrimination.”). It is remarkable how similar the reasoning of
contemporary post-racialists is to that of the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court, which routinely struck down
democratically enacted measures designed to promote racial equality. But perhaps it should not be remarkable.
Recent scholarship has shown that the narrative that “we have done enough” arose immediately following the
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the right to vote. In his concurring opinion, he argued that “the violence,
intimidation, and subterfuge that led Congress to pass § 5 and this Court to
uphold it no longer remains.”107 Because, in his view, section 5 represents
federal “[p]unishment for long past sins,”108 rather than a legitimate response
to contemporary discrimination and the political legacy of past discrimination,
it is unconstitutional.109
III. THE WAY FORWARD
This Essay has argued that the Supreme Court’s post-racialist jurisprudence
treats the effective exercise of minority political power as inherently
suspicious. The Court has distorted the traditional justifications for
countermajoritarian judicial action in service of a narrative of pervasive white
victimization. Its decisions reflect a worldview in which the primary problem
of racial injustice today is discrimination against whites by virtue of insidious
minority political power. In this final Part, I suggest ways in which the Court’s
colorblindess doctrine should be modified to better reflect the realities of
minority political power and to allow the political process to function properly.
A. Changing the Narrative
Recent scholarship has argued that the Court’s colorblindness doctrine is as
concerned with the expressive function of race-conscious government action as
with its instrumental effects.110 Richard Primus has called this the “visible-

Civil War and has been continuous thereafter. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86
WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 928–37 (2009) (discussing the recurring historical pattern of resistance to civil rights
efforts).
107 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2527 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
108 Id. at 2525.
109 Subsequent to the Court’s decision in NAMUDNO, several new challenges to the constitutionality of
section 5 were filed. Two of the district courts in these new cases have found section 5 to be constitutional. See
LaRoque v. Holder, No. 10-0561 (JDB), 2011 WL 6413850 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011); Shelby County v. Holder,
811 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.D.C. 2011). In two other cases that remain pending, the courts have not yet reached a
decision on the merits. See Arizona v. Holder, No. 11-01559 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 25, 2011); Florida v. United
States, No. 11-01428 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 1, 2011). The Supreme Court has also reiterated in a recent per
curiam opinion that at least some Justices continue to believe that section 5 raises “serious constitutional
questions.” Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934, 942 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2513)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In light of these developments, it seems very likely that the Court will soon
directly confront the question of section 5’s constitutionality.
110 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 19 (stating that the Court’s colorblindness doctrine is grounded in
concerns about the message sent by remedial or diversifying race-conscious government action and arguing
that the Court should therefore incorporate First Amendment principles into its analysis in such cases); Richard
Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s concern in
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victims” reading of the colorblindness doctrine.111 The Court condemns
government action redressing racial inequality when such action creates visible
white victims around whom a narrative consistent with post-racialism can
revolve.112 As Primus has argued, “One predictable way for the race-conscious
aspect of a governmental practice to acquire a divisive social meaning is for
the practice to create visible victims. Visible victims lend themselves to easily
understood narratives of injustice, as every good plaintiffs’ lawyer knows.”113
The visibility of individual white victims provides a rallying point for
resentment; once such resentment manifests, the Court’s conservatives contend
that the government’s action (rather than whites’ reaction) threatens social
cohesion and is therefore unconstitutional.114
I believe that this worldview persists because, when racial minorities
exercise their political power to level the playing field, they often do so in
ways that create visible, individual white “victims” who are perceived as
paying the price for something that is not their fault. Subordination of racial
minorities, however, is often accomplished in ways that render individual
victims invisible. Accordingly, when racial minorities use the political process
to interrupt the perpetuation of white privilege, we falsely see a world in which
a politically dominant group (racial minorities) is discriminating against
discrete and identifiable victims (individual whites). By contrast, because the
continued subordination of racial minorities is often systemic and its causes are
often invisible, it is seen as being “just the way things are.”
One possible way to combat the narrative of insidious minority political
power would be to present a counternarrative highlighting continued racial
inequality. Both in litigation and in the public debate, it should never go
cases like Ricci is with the divisive social meaning that the Court believes is sent by government action
explicitly redressing racial inequality); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278 (2011) (identifying the
antibalkanization principle as an independent doctrinal middle ground between colorblindness theory and
antisubordination theory, under which government action violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is seen
as causing divisiveness and threatening social cohesion).
111 See Primus, supra note 110, at 1369–74.
112 See id. at 1372.
113 Id.
114 See Siegel, supra note 110, at 1298 (noting that Justices have treated the “resentment of the
‘dispreferred’ [i.e., whites] as a reason to impose restrictions on race-conscious remedies”). This reasoning
treats the government’s action, rather than the reaction thereto, as the cause of the problem. As I have written
elsewhere, the Court’s colorblindness doctrine “has embraced a kind of heckler’s veto theory, long formally
discredited in free speech jurisprudence, whereby the fact that government attention to racial inequality
offends some individuals or allegedly creates divisiveness is sufficient to prohibit the message.” Carter, supra
note 19, at 57.
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unremarked that racial minorities (particularly blacks and Latinos) are at or
near the bottom of the scale by nearly every material measure115 and that racial
minorities’ increasing electoral success falls well short of systemic political
empowerment.116 But the Court’s colorblindness doctrine currently has little
room for arguments based on racial remediation or for data regarding political
empowerment. Indeed, evidence of continued racial disparities was directly
presented to the Court in Croson, Ricci, and NAMUDNO, only to be cursorily
dismissed because it contradicted the Court’s preferred narrative of those
cases.
In Croson, for example, the City relied on a variety of evidence to defend
its decision to adopt the affirmative action plan at issue, including
statistics showing that minority-owned businesses have received
virtually no city contracting dollars and rarely if ever belonged to
area trade associations; testimony by municipal officials that
discrimination has been widespread in the local construction industry;
and . . . exhaustive
and
widely
publicized
federal
studies . . . show[ing] . . . pervasive discrimination in the Nation’s
117
tight-knit construction industry.

The Court concluded, however, that such legislative fact finding was “of little
probative value in establishing identified discrimination in the Richmond
construction industry.”118 In Ricci, abundant evidence was presented to the
Court regarding pervasive racial discrimination in municipal employment in
general and in New Haven in particular.119 The majority opinion completely
disregarded such evidence, reducing the case to the simple proposition that
“[t]he City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates
were white.”120 And in NAMUDNO, the Court was presented with voluminous
evidence—including over 27,000 pages of combined fact finding by the House
and Senate—of continued voting discrimination justifying the reenactment of

115

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Indeed, a recent study has found that, in the South, despite the presence of substantial numbers of
minority legislators, “[b]lack voters and elected officials have less influence now than at any time since the
civil rights era,” due to racially polarized voting and race-based redistricting that dilutes black voters’
influence. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, RESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN
POLITICS? 1 (2011), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/upload/research/files/
Resegregation%20in%20Southern%20Politics.pdf.
117 488 U.S. 469, 529 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 500 (majority opinion).
119 See 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2690–92 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 2674 (majority opinion).
116
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section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.121 The NAMUDNO opinion failed to
address this evidence directly, stating only that “[i]t may be that . . . conditions
continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the Act imposes current
burdens and must be justified by current needs.”122 Thus, efforts to render the
subordination of racial minorities visible are unlikely to draw much sympathy
from the current Supreme Court.
A second option would be for racial minorities and their allies to continue
to use the political process to address racial inequality, but to do so in ways
that avoid creating visible white victims. In a case like Croson, for example,
the city council could have created an affirmative action program based not
upon race but upon socioeconomic disadvantage, or the number of previous
City contracts a business had received, or some combination of other factors
that would correlate closely with the race of previously excluded groups.123
Similarly, in Ricci, the City of New Haven could have used facially neutral
measures to avoid the racial disparity in promotions from occurring in the first
place.124 But the Court has proven adept at finding equal protection violations
even in situations where no identifiable white individuals have been harmed in
any tangible way.125 Avoiding creating visible white victims therefore will not
by itself provide a safe haven for the exercise of minority political power.
Thus, while changing the narrative is important, it will be insufficient
without an accompanying doctrinal shift. I suggest that equal protection review
incorporate an initial analysis that I call “process scrutiny.” To the extent that
the Court’s suspicion of minority political power is grounded in process-defect
reasoning, the Court should scrutinize not just the goals and methods of the

121 See 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228–30, 250–68 (2008), rev’d sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One
v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
122 129 S. Ct. at 2511–12.
123 The disadvantage of such methods is that they would only imperfectly address racial disparities
because such proxies would not correspond exactly to the underlying racial disparities. Moreover, focusing on
class or other factors, rather than calling attention to the continued racial and structural aspects of inequality,
cedes the ground for debate to the post-racialists. See, e.g., Barnes et al., supra note 3, at 1001 (“[T]here is
something disingenuous and distasteful about not calling racism out for what it is—about buying into the myth
that the United States is post-race.”).
124 Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Ricci explicitly stated that employers could take such measures
notwithstanding Ricci’s holding. See 129 S. Ct. at 2677 (“Title VII does not prohibit an employer from
considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair
opportunity for all individuals, regardless of their race.”).
125 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that strict scrutiny applied to a state redistricting
plan that created a majority-black voting district, even though white voters made no claim that the district
diluted whites’ voting strength or otherwise caused a tangible injury).
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challenged governmental action but also the political process that led to the
governmental action at issue.
B. Changing the Doctrine: Process Scrutiny
Current equal protection jurisprudence holds that any purposeful
government consideration of race triggers strict scrutiny.126 Under strict
scrutiny, the courts are to closely examine both the government’s ends and
means. The reviewing court is to assess the importance of the government’s
goal to determine whether it is sufficiently compelling to justify the use of
race.127 Even if the goal is compelling, strict scrutiny also requires that the
government’s means be narrowly tailored or the least restrictive method of
achieving the compelling goal.128 Thus, race-conscious government action is
presumptively unconstitutional and will be upheld only in a very few cases.129
To the extent that the Court is suspicious of minority political power and
therefore believes that process-defect reasoning is applicable in such cases, I
suggest the addition of a preliminary step to the equal protection analysis. Prior
to the application of strict scrutiny in cases where racial minorities have used
the political process to enact legislation directed toward remedying the effects
of past discrimination or otherwise leveling the playing field, the courts should
scrutinize the political process that led to the decision in question, not merely
the end result. To be sure, some Justices believe that strict scrutiny itself
accomplishes this purpose. In Adarand, for example, Justice O’Connor wrote
that strict scrutiny is designed
to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use
of a highly suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen
‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility

126

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
See id.
128 See id.
129 In Adarand, the Court noted that it “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory,
but fatal in fact.’” Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)). Thus, while strict scrutiny will almost always result in the government’s action
being declared unconstitutional, there are limited circumstances in which it will be upheld. See, e.g., Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of Michigan Law School’s consideration of race as a
“plus” factor in admissions decisions).
127
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that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
130
or stereotype.

However, this presumes the invalidity of the process from the results and then
scrutinizes the results to see if they are both important enough and precise
enough to “warrant use of a highly suspect tool.” Treating the results of the
political process as “highly suspect” makes sense when reviewing the outcome
of majoritarian processes subordinating racial minorities, because rationales
other than or in addition to process-defect theory justify such suspicion. For
example, we presume that laws burdening racial minorities are likely to reflect
“prejudice and antipathy”131 because of the history of racism and white
supremacy.132 These factors, combined with the group’s numerical
disadvantage, serve as a proxy for a process defect.
Such presumptions make no sense, of course, when the political process
yields results aimed at redressing racial inequality. Rather, the sole
instrumental justification for the “extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process”133 embodied by strict scrutiny would be that the
political process has malfunctioned in such a way as to effectively exclude a
racial group, i.e., whites. This is the point that Justice Alito was attempting to
make, however inaccurately, in his concurrence in Ricci. But rather than
assuming a process defect ipse dixit, the courts should actually and directly
scrutinize the political process leading to the challenged action to ascertain
whether it malfunctioned.
Such process scrutiny134 would have two elements, one empirical and one
interpretive. The first would be an empirical examination of the processes

130 515 U.S. at 226 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality
opinion)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
131 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
132 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (commenting that “a history of
purposeful unequal treatment” of the minority group counsels in favor of applying strict scrutiny).
133 Id.
134 The term “process scrutiny” has previously appeared in the scholarly literature in the context of the
Takings Clause. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, The Abstruse Science: Kelo, Lochner, and Representation
Reinforcement in the Public Use Debate, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 375, 411–12 (2008) (advocating that courts
scrutinize the process by which a takings decision was reached as a way of determining whether “procedural
irregularities” or “improper influence” have distorted the political process). While the goal of such process
scrutiny is different in that context—exposing when a putative public purpose for a taking is a pretext for an
underlying desire to benefit a private party—the task it performs is somewhat similar here. However, rather
than seeking to expose a pretextual explanation for government action, I use “process scrutiny” to indicate a
judicial examination of the political process with an eye toward whether a process defect has occurred such
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leading to the challenged decision. Some key points of inquiry would include
whether the decision was reached by virtue of open and transparent
proceedings, whether dissenting views (if any) of both the citizenry and public
officials were expressed in a forum that could reasonably be expected to take
them into account, and whether socioeconomic or other disparities can be said
to have effectively diminished the voice of those who disagreed with the
governmental action. In other words, was the political process actually
working properly?
The second element would involve interpreting what actually happened
with an eye toward the perceived fairness of the processes leading to the
challenged decision. Factors for examination would include whether the result
would reasonably be perceived as reinforcing the dominance of one group,
whether dissenting voices would reasonably be perceived as sufficiently
marginalized that they would have exited the political process, and whether the
political process would reasonably be perceived as having been illegitimately
captured by one racial group. In other words, would the political process have
been perceived as actually working properly?135
To take one example, applying such an analysis to the facts of Ricci would
yield the result that there was no reason to be particularly suspicious about the
effective exercise of minority political power in New Haven. As to the first
inquiry, it is clear that the political process actually functioned properly in
Ricci. The decision not to certify the test results was made by governmental
actors responding to the kinds of political pressure from ordinary citizens that
are the workings of ordinary politics. New Haven’s procedures required that
the Civil Service Board (CSB) certify a list of applicants who would be eligible

that the exercise of minority political power should be subject to strict scrutiny. Future articles will more fully
develop the contours of such process scrutiny.
135 I realize that both elements that I propose involve some degree of subjectivity, as there is no single
completely objective set of criteria against which to judge whether the political process has actually
malfunctioned or would reasonably be perceived as having malfunctioned. Cf. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
901–02 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court’s vote-dilution jurisprudence
under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by arguing that “there are undoubtedly an infinite number of theories
of effective suffrage, representation, and the proper apportionment of political power in a representative
democracy that could be drawn upon to answer the questions posed in [vote-dilution cases]” but noting that
“such matters of political theory are beyond the ordinary sphere of federal judges” and “are not readily
subjected to any judicially manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to select between
competing theories”). Nonetheless, the application of some actual standards for determining when the political
process has malfunctioned is preferable to current doctrine, which presupposes the existence of a process
defect without the benefit of any rigorous examination of the underlying processes or even of logical
presumptions arising from a history of discrimination against the allegedly disadvantaged group.
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for civil service positions.136 Once the controversy over the test results erupted,
the CSB, which is an “autonomous body of City of New Haven citizens,”137
held a series of five open hearings at which members of the public as well as
governmental officials spoke for and against certifying the results.138 The CSB
heard testimony “from test takers, the test designer, subject-matter experts,
City officials, union leaders, and community members,”139 including
individuals and organized interest groups. In addition to the transparency of the
formal process, the matter was very much in public view and part of the public
discourse in New Haven at the time.140 Moreover, the City’s board of aldermen
(the elected city council) was also briefed on the situation, providing yet
another venue for community input and participation. In short, Ricci involved a
public matter roundly debated in public fora, providing opportunities for
democratic engagement. At the end of the process, democratically accountable
officials, acting in a politically responsive fashion, took a position on a
political controversy.
The political process in Ricci also likely would have been perceived as
functioning properly. Although members of the community may have
vehemently disagreed as to the proper substantive outcome, it is unlikely that
whites in New Haven would have reasonably perceived the political process to
be so dominated by minority interests or otherwise closed to them that they
were effectively denied procedural justice. Whites were well represented in
city government, and the final decision on certification—a 2–2 split by the
CSB—belies the impression of minority subversion or capture of the city
government. It may have been true that blacks and Latinos were “a politically
136

Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2665 (2009).
Civil Service, CITY OF NEW HAVEN, http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/HumanResources/
CivilService.asp (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
138 See Joint Appendix, supra note 62. It is worth noting that these hearings were held over the initial
protest of Rev. Kimber, who apparently would have preferred that the Board of Fire Commissioners first have
the opportunity to meet privately with the CSB, which does much to dispel the notion that the process operated
through secret back-room dealing. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2685 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Reverend Kimber
protested the public meeting, arguing that he and the other fire commissioners should first be allowed to meet
with the CSB in private.”).
139 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2692 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
140 For example, the issue was thoroughly covered in the local media. See, e.g., William Kaempffer &
Angela Carter, City Fire Tests Have No Easy, Cheap Fix, NEW HAVEN REG. (Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.
nhregister.com/articles/2004/02/02/import/10901527.txt; William Kaempffer, Fire Department Sure to Be
Sued over Exams, NEW HAVEN REG. (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/02/06/import/
10927406.txt; William Kaempffer, Fire Exams Pose Problems, City Lawyer Says, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 23,
2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/2004/01/23/import/10855004.txt; William Kaempffer, Firefighters
Say Tests for Promotions Are Flawed, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.nhregister.com/articles/
2004/01/21/import/10840559.txt.
137
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important racial constituency” in New Haven,141 that a local black minister
apparently had the ear of the mayor,142 and that city officials and the CSB were
persuaded for political reasons not to certify the test results. Nonetheless, in
light of the history of racial minorities’ political and social subordination, it
remains difficult to see how these facts could reasonably be perceived as
amounting to a systemic defect in New Haven’s democratic processes unless
successful political advocacy is itself grounds for suspicion. It is inconsistent
(to say the least) for the Court’s conservative members to view political
influence as especially pernicious in itself when it leads to racially egalitarian
political outcomes, while simultaneously believing that, in the context of
corporate campaign contributions, it is legitimate for politicians to “respond by
producing those political outcomes the supporter favors.”143
CONCLUSION
If current demographic projections are correct, racial minorities will be a
numerical majority in America by the middle of this century.144 As that shift
begins, racial minorities in many areas of the country will increasingly hold
political power while continuing to face social and economic subordination.
Newly empowered minority groups will presumably use the political process
to enact laws aimed at ameliorating continued racial inequality.
Although the popular narrative of constitutional history views the federal
judiciary—and especially the Supreme Court—as the champions of racial
equality, the Court has more often acted in countermajoritarian ways to
obstruct racial progress than to advance it.145 As racial minorities use the

141

Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2688 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2684.
143 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297
(2003), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
144 See Minorities Expected to Be Majority in 2050, CNN (Aug. 13, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/200808-13/us/census.minorities_1_hispanic-population-census-bureau-white-population?_s=PM:US.
145 See William M. Carter, Jr., Judicial Review of Thirteenth Amendment Legislation: “Congruence and
Proportionality” or “Necessary and Proper”?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 973, 988 (2007) (“[While] Congress was
girding for [the Civil W]ar . . . , enacting the Reconstruction Amendments after the war’s end, and enforcing
them during the brief Reconstruction period via a variety of civil rights measures that were incredibly
progressive for their time[, ]the Supreme Court was issuing rulings that were protective of the white
supremacist regime Congress was attempting to dismantle.”); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the
Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 154 (1995) (“The claim that the judiciary is the exclusive or even dominant
protector of our liberties is a very recent and mistaken idea, one that has arisen principally in the civil liberties
community in the last generation. This view of constitutional structure comes from the experience of Brown v.
Board of Education and the moral authority of that decision.” (footnote omitted)).
142
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political process to vindicate their goals, an activist federal judiciary will more
often prove to be an obstacle to racial justice than a vehicle for it, as long as it
remains uniquely suspicious of minority political power.

